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A local bootstrap method is proposed for the analysis of electoral vote-count first-digit
frequencies, complementing the Benford’s Law limit. The method is calibrated on five
presidential-election first rounds (2002–2006) and applied to the 2009 Iranian presidential-
election first round. Candidate K has a highly significant (p < 0.15%) excess of vote counts
starting with the digit 7. This leads to other anomalies, two of which are individually sig-
nificant at p ∼ 0.1%, and one at p ∼ 1%. Independently, Iranian pre-election opinion polls
significantly reject the official results unless the five polls favouring candidate A are consid-
ered alone. If the latter represent normalised data and a linear, least-squares, equal-weighted
fit is used, then either candidates R and K suffered a sudden, dramatic (70% ± 15%) loss of
electoral support just prior to the election, or the official results are rejected (p ∼ 0.01%).
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1. Introduction
The results of the 12 June 2009 presidential-election first round held in the Islamic
Republic of Iran are of high political importance in Iran. International interest
in these results is also considerable. On 14 June 2009, the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) published a table of the numbers of votes vij received by the j-th of the n = 4
candidates for the i-th of m = 366 voting areas [23]. In order to avoid focussing
on personalities, the four candidates will be referred to here as A, R, K, and M,
following the order given in the table. These letters correspond to the conventional
Roman alphabet transliteration of the four candidates’ names by which they are
frequently referred to. The total votes yj :=
∑
i vij for these four candidates from
the MOI table give A as the winner with 24,515,209 votes, against R with 659,281
votes, K with 328,979 votes, and M with 13,225,330 votes. A second voting round
was not held.
The total numbers of votes per voting area xi ≥
∑
j vij (invalid votes are included
in xi) in the MOI’s data vary from about 10
4 to 106, i.e. by two orders of magnitude
(powers of 10). This suggests that Benford’s Law (Newcomb 27; Benford 8) may
be applicable, i.e. it may be useful to test the null hypothesis that the first digit in
the candidates’ absolute numbers of votes, represented in the decimal system, are
consistent with random selection from a uniform, base 10 logarithmic distribution
modulo 1. This test has been historically proposed for finding hints of artificial
interference in statistical data sets. The reason is that common intuition suggests
that the frequencies of occurrence of the first digit (using the decimal system) in a
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large data set of empirical data that cover at least an order of magnitude should
be approximately equally distributed between the nine non-zero digits, i.e. about
1/9 ≈ 11% of the first digits should be 1, about 11% should be 2, . . . , and about
11% should be 9. Benford’s Law contradicts this. For example, the most striking
characteristic of Benford’s Law follows from Eq. (1) below: the first digit is 1 with
a frequency of log10 2 ≈ 30%, i.e. it occurs much more frequently than any other
digit, with a much higher frequency than 11%. The frequencies of other digits
than the first digit can also be analysed with Benford’s Law. Independently of the
present analysis, the distributions of the second digit were analysed for this same
data set [19] and the last digits of a related data set also released by the MOI were
analysed [6] using a method developed earlier using Nigerian electoral data [7].
The decimal first digit version of Benford’s Law [8, 27] can be given informally
by stating that for many real world samples of values that span several orders of
magnitude, the relative frequency of the occurrence of digit d ∈ {1, . . . , 9} as the
first digit in decimal representations of real numbers tends towards
f(d) = log10
(
1 +
1
d
)
(1)
as the sample size and logarithmic distribution width increase. Equation (1) should
be a good approximation if a sample can be expected to be drawn from a probability
distribution of a random variable X that varies slowly enough over several orders
of magnitude in such a way that
Y := log10X − ⌊log10X⌋, (2)
i.e. the folding of X to a single decade, is approximately uniform, where ⌊x⌋ is the
greatest integer ≤ x. Because the logarithmic scale is folded into a single decade,
statistical populations do not necessarily need to span many orders of magnitude in
order to approximately satisfy Benford’s Law. A folded logarithmic distribution (for
a fixed base) will tend towards a uniform distribution as the logarithmic variance
of the unfolded distribution increases. However, it is not clear how fast and smooth
this convergence occurs. For example, a logarithmically uniform distribution on
z1 ≤ log10X < z2 will not fold to a uniform distribution unless z2 − z1 is an
integer. Nevertheless, historically, Benford’s Law has been found to apply well in
practice in many cases, especially when several different distributions are combined
to constitute a single distribution.
A detailed justification and generalisation of several equivalent formulations of
Benford’s Law are given by Hill, who refers to Benford’s Law as the “central-
limit-like theorem for significant digits” [16]. To what degree should Benford’s Law
apply to the Iranian MOI data set for the 2009 presidential election first round
of voting? To the extent that the total voting populations xi of the voting areas
used for the MOI data set constitute a mix of many processes—the growth of
towns and cities over thousands of years—that can be modelled as if they were a
mix of several different (mostly non-uniform) random processes corresponding to
a mix of probability distributions, including the still rapid (over 1%) population
growth and the freedom to vote anywhere in Iran independently of one’s place of
residence, these total votes xi may to some degree satisfy base-neutrality and/or
scale-neutrality. [See Definition 5 of [16] for definitions of base and scale bias.] On
the other hand, political and administrative effects might introduce strong base or
scale biases.
However, rather than xi, what are even more likely to constitute a mix of (mostly
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non-uniform) random processes are the processes leading to the fractional voting
rates v˜ij := vij/xi ≤ 1 for individual candidates for voting areas of a given popu-
lation size xi, where approximately equal xi’s are grouped together at x. If (i) the
voting rates v˜ij vary by a large fraction of an order of magnitude near xi ≈ x, then
the votes vij in the voting areas of size xi ≈ x should also scatter by a large fraction
of an order of magnitude. If, in addition, (ii) the distribution of log10 v˜ij(xi ≈ x)
varies slowly enough with log10 x, then it should be possible that scale-neutrality
is satisfied well enough for Benford’s Law to be applicable.
Iranian society has a continuous and complex urban history dating back about
6000 years. Hence, at least as much as in any other complex society, Iranian voting
patterns can be expected to be the result of a highly rich mix of numerous social,
political, economic, and historical factors that can influence voting decisions, as
well as natural environmental factors (e.g. the weather [2, 14]) and the cognitive
margin of freedom that individuals retain with respect to these broader factors.
Are all these factors enough to satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) sufficiently well
such that the MOI data set can be statistically tested using Benford’s Law for the
vote counts vij?
These qualitative descriptions of the two conditions hide a lot of quantitative
detail, which could require as many as six parameters to quantify. For example,
these could include, respectively, quantitative definitions of (i) “vary” in terms of
standard deviations, “large”, and “≈”, and of (ii) at least two parameters to char-
acterise the distribution of log10 v˜ij , and “slowly”. Clearly, it would be preferable
to use a non-parametric alternative. Moreover, rather than attempt a theoretical
proof of whether or not a formalisation of these conditions would imply Benford’s
Law, it would be preferable to formalise the conditions in such a way that they
define a statistical model of the data that can be used directly, independently of
how closely the data can be expected to approach the limiting form of Benford’s
Law.
Hence, here, a statistical model is defined using a local bootstrap method, mo-
tivated by conditions (i) and (ii). This is presented in Section 2.2. This method
is non-parametric in terms of the data set being tested, but uses one fixed, base-
related parameter. The aim of the “local” property of the method is to increase the
method’s specificity (reduce the chance that it falsely rejects the null hypothesis
that no artificial interference in the data has taken place), at the cost of decreasing
the method’s power (the chance that the method misses genuine anomalies is in-
creased). Bootstrap methods can give biased and/or skewed estimates of confidence
intervals, so the probabilities inferred using the method are calibrated against sev-
eral recent presidential-election first rounds prior to the 2009 Iranian presidential-
election first round. These data sets and the Iranian 2009 MOI vote counts are
described in Section 2.3. The first digit frequencies in the Iranian 2009 MOI data
are examined using this calibrated probability distribution.
In addition to the internal statistical test provided by first-digit frequencies, ex-
ternal tests of the MOI data can be made by comparing these data to a compilation
of pre-election opinion polls that were openly and transparently documented by the
English-language community prior to the election day. This compilation of polls is
described in Section 2.4.
The calibration of the local bootstrap simulations using the earlier presiden-
tial elections is presented in Section 3.1. The first-digit frequencies of the four
candidates’ official vote counts and their raw and calibrated confidence levels are
presented in Section 3.2 and Figs 10–13. The internal consistency among the pre-
election opinion polls and their consistency with the MOI data set are presented
in Section 3.3. Discussion, including several anomalies that follow from the basic
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result, is given in Section 4. A summary and conclusion are presented in Section 5.
2. Method
2.1 Data and model files
The data from [23] used in this analysis and the data from the French (2002, 2007),
Iranian (2005), Polish (2005) and Brazilian (2006) presidential-election first rounds
are listed in the text file pres elections. An octave script1 is provided as a plain
text file benford elections.m for carrying out the analysis in this paper, using
the input file pres elections. Both files are part of the preprint version of this
article at ArXiv.org.2
2.2 Empirical, local bootstrap model of presidential election vote counts
An empirical, local bootstrap model of presidential election vote counts is defined
as follows.
2.2.1 Local bootstrap
For the 2009 Iranian presidential election or another similar presidential election,
let the numbers of votes received by the j-th of the n candidates for the i-th of m
voting areas be vij . Let the total numbers of votes per voting area be xi :=
∑n+1
j=1 vij
(where vi(n+1) represents invalid votes if known, and otherwise is set to zero),
the total votes per candidate be yj :=
∑
i vij , and the normalised voting rates
(estimates of a candidate’s electoral popularity in a given area) be v˜ij := vij/xi ≤ 1.
Sort the xi such that the sequence xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xim is (w.l.o.g.) in ascending order.
Definition 2.1 A local bootstrap realisation for candidate j is a set of simulated
votes
{v˜ik′ j xik}k=1,...,m (3)
where the values k′(k) are drawn randomly from G, a realisation of a Gaussian
probability density function of width m∆, where ∆ := log10(10/9) ≈ 0.0458, and
centred at k, truncated at the limits of {k}, i.e.
k′(k) := max(1, min(m, ⌊G(k,m∆) + 0.5⌋)). (4)
The meaning of v˜ik′ j can be thought of by starting with an extremely small
value of ∆, rather than the defined value. For example, ∆ = 10−100 would in
practice make all realisations of G(k,m∆) on a 2012 computer yield G = k, so
that, effectively, k′(k) ≡ k and v˜ik′ j ≡ v˜ikj := vikj/xik , giving a realisation identical
to the empirical data set. Increasing ∆ to 0.0458 allows a bootstrap from voting
areas with the index k′ slightly lower or higher than k, i.e. a “real” voting rate for
candidate j is selected from a voting area with a slightly lower or higher (or possibly
the same) total voting population. Thus, this is a “local” bootstrap—the simulated
data are generated using the empirical data directly, but instead of the standard
1http://www.gnu.org/software/octave
2http://arXiv.org/e-print/0906.2789
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bootstrap method, the random selection process consists of just a slight “nudge”
to the original data among voting areas of about the same voting population size.
If the xik are distributed log-uniformly over one decade, i.e. if log10 xik is dis-
tributed log-uniformly within the decade from z1 to 10z1 for some z1, then the frac-
tion of xik values contained within an interval in k of width m∆ is (m∆)/m = ∆.
That is, in this case, the smoothing scale in xik is that of the narrowest first-digit
interval, ∆ := log10(10/9). Narrower and wider xik distributions will be less and
more smoothed, respectively.
A full bootstrap realisation over the set of voting rates v˜ij for a given candidate
j would be equivalent to assuming that the probability distributions for voting
rates in low and high population voting areas are independent and identically
distributed, which is unlikely to be realistic. Apart from some correlation between
voting area size xik and various sociological characteristics, the Poisson nature of
many processes should modify the variance of the voting rate as a function of xik .
If Definition 2.1 is extended to the limit of ∆ → 0, i.e. if the “local” aspect
of the definition is taken to its limit, then the realisations approach an exact re-
production of the empirical data set itself. For a value of ∆ that is small, but
not so small as to mostly generate exact reproductions of the data, the realisations
should sample the distribution of voting rates v˜ikj near xik . That is, any vote realisa-
tion {v˜ik′ jxik}|k−k0|<m∆ should approximate the actual distribution {vikj}|k−k0|<m∆
near any xik0 . Hence, within the smallest of the nine logarithmic intervals relevant
for decimal first digit counts, the realisations should (a) (re-)sample the empirical
distribution of voting rates near xik , whether or not the variance is large or small,
and (b) should approximately mimic the changing properties of this distribution as
xik decreases or increases. That is, the realisations should formalise the conditions
(i) and (ii) presented in Section 1. To the degree that these two conditions are sat-
isfied, Benford’s Law is likely to be a good approximation. However, the first-digit
frequency distributions inferred from the local bootstrap realisations can be used
independently of the degree to which the two conditions are satisfied, i.e., without
assuming the Benford’s Law limiting case.
Thus, the voting data xi and vij themselves are used to construct discrete prob-
ability distributions from which simulated samples of the set of votes are generated
using random resampling allowing repeats. The simulated samples are used to es-
timate the confidence intervals for first-digit counts. The method is “local” in the
sense that each bootstrap is performed within a small subset of the data near a
given total vote xik , so that the simulated data set should very closely match the
empirical data set. The method is non-parametric in terms of the data set, and has
a fixed, base-related dependence through ∆.
For these reasons, the method is conservative. By using the data to model itself,
some types of artificial interference in the data may be mimicked in the simula-
tions, so that the interference would not be detected. In contrast, any statistically
significant difference between the simulations and the data would imply that the
data are unusually sensitive to resampling the voting rates v˜ij for voting areas of
approximately the same voting population x.
For example, suppose that about 20% of voters in voting areas of voting popu-
lation x ≈ 80, 000 typically voted for candidate j, but this varied down to about
10% and up to about 40%, i.e. from 8,000 to 32,000 people voted for candidate
j in voting areas that have about 80,000 voters, with 16,000 being a typical vote
for candidate j. The local bootstrap model proposed here assumes that reselect-
ing these percentages randomly from within the same range, 8,000 to 32,000, for
this same set of voting areas, and applying the same process for each x, should
not affect the overall statistical results. The model does not assume any particular
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shape of the distribution of vij in the range from 8,000 to 32,000, e.g. normal or
log-normal, unimodal or multimodal, nor does it assume any particular skewness
or kurtosis. It only assumes that the distribution should statistically match the
observed distribution of the voting rates v˜ikj within this limited subset of voting
areas.
If outliers (rare extreme values, e.g. 800 votes for candidate j in one of the
voting areas of 80,000 voters in the example just given) exist among the v˜ij of the
empirical data set, then they will also be included in the simulated data sets with
the same frequencies (in the limit of many realisations). This is an example of a
potentially suspect feature of the empirical data set—outliers—that would not be
detected to be significantly unusual by this method. Hence, it is difficult to see
how randomly reassigning votes in a statistically identical way among these voting
areas should destroy any statistical properties of the votes, such as their decimal
first-digit frequencies.
2.2.2 Empirical calibration
Using candidates in presidential elections other than the 2009 Iranian election
first round, as detailed in Section 2.3.2, local bootstrap realisations using Defini-
tion 2.1 are realised for each candidate j, except for candidates whose votes are
too low. Candidates are considered to have vote counts that are too low if 1% or
more of their vote counts satisfy vij ≤ 1. A vote count of zero has an undefined
logarithm, and vote counts below 10 are likely to create strong discreteness effects.
Hill’s formalisation of Benford’s Law strictly applies only to random variables on
the set of positive reals, not to a random variable on non-negative integers [16].
Hence, low vote counts are likely to decrease the degree to which Benford’s-Law-
like behaviour occurs. Candidate 10 in the Polish 2005 first-round election and
candidates 1 and 4 in the Brazilian 2006 first-round election are excluded from the
analysis using this definition of “too low”. This leaves 51 candidates from the five
elections. None of the Iranian 2009 election first-round candidates are excluded by
this criterion.
From an ensemble of local bootstrap realisations for a given candidate j in a
given election, let the relative frequency with which the frequency of first digit d1
in a simulated vote count {v˜ik′ jxik}k=1,...,m is found to be below the frequency of d1
in the candidate’s empirical vote count {vij}i=1,...,m be cbj(d1). This corresponds
to an upper, one-sided, bootstrap-estimated confidence level when cbj > 0.5.
Bootstrap methods in general can require corrections for bias and skewness. One
recommended way to correct for this in the absence of external empirical data is the
bias-corrected, accelerated method. However, for small samples this is not always
reliable in practice [34]. Moreover, in the present case, we have several empirical
data sets that are publicly available for analysis, are independent of the data set of
interest, and should represent similar sociological processes. Hence, the approach
adopted here is to use these empirical data sets to calibrate a correction for bias
and skewness.
The bootstrap confidence levels cbj(d) obtained for the 9 non-zero digits for the
51 candidates constitute a set of nb = 459 values of cb. If the local bootstrap
method is accurate in estimating cb, then the frequency distribution of cb should
be approximated by P (c < cb) = cb. If this is not the case, then the actual fre-
quency distribution of cb over the whole control data set of 459 values can be used
to estimate an empirical set of confidence levels ce. This implicitly assumes that
the 459 values are independently drawn from a single probability distribution. This
is clearly only an approximation, depending on the degree to which the number
of digits (9), the numbers of candidates per election (5-16, where low vote candi-
dates have been excluded as stated above), and the number of elections (5) are
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high enough. None of these three numbers is individually high, but putting them
together, nb = 459 may be high enough for this to be a sufficient approximation.
Provided that the function ce(cb) is smooth enough over the range of interest, this
can be used to convert individual cb estimates in the data set of interest to more
accurate confidence levels ce(cb). This is the approach adopted here.
The most important regions of the function ce(cb) are those near 0 and 1. In
particular, any fit ce(cb) must satisfy ce(0) = 0 and ce(1) = 1. Let us define
αb
− := 1− cb, cb < c∗b
αb
+ := cb, cb ≥ c
∗
b, (5)
where c∗b is the median value of cb. The nb values of cb are sorted in ascending
order and each k-th value is paired with
ce(k) := (k − 0.5)/nb, (6)
so that
αe
− := 1− ce, cb < c∗b
αe
+ := ce, cb ≥ c
∗
b (7)
can be defined. Hence, an almost-everywhere smooth, continuous, piecewise fit
ce(cb) allowing one free parameter for each part of ce(cb) is obtained by (non-linear)
least squares fitting 2αe
− against (αb−/c∗b)
β− and 2αe
+ against [αb
+/(1 − c∗b)]
β+ ,
over the intervals cb < c
∗
b and cb ≥ c
∗
b, respectively, where β
− and β+ are free
parameters. The fitted solution is
ce(cb) =
0.5
(
cb
c∗b
)β−
, cb < c
∗
b
1− 0.5
(
1−cb
1−c∗b
)β+
, cb ≥ c
∗
b.
(8)
This function necessarily satisfies ce(0) = 0 and ce(1) = 1 and is continuous through
cb = c
∗
b, where ce(c
∗
b) = 0.5. The first derivative dce/dcb is not necessarily continu-
ous at cb = c
∗
b, but if the values of cb are themselves distributed smoothly, then the
derivative should not change abruptly. The non-linear least squares fitting method
used in this work to calculate β− and β+ (Sect. 3.1, Fig. 8) is iterative. The power
β− (or β+) is initially assumed to lie in the range (0.2, 5.0). Ten uniformly spaced
values in this range are tested and the minimum of χ2 is used to chose the best
estimate for that iteration. Successive iterations halve the width of the range, cen-
tre it on the previous best fit, and test ten values in the new, smaller range. Fifty
iterations easily converge and give the accuracy required.
2.3 Data sets
2.3.1 Iranian Ministry of the Interior 14 June 2009 data set
The primary data of interest here consist of the data set published by the Ira-
nian Ministry of the Interior (MOI) data on 14 June 2009 [23]. The data set was
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archived the same day at the URL http://www.webcitation.org/5hXHfYNbN.1
A plain text form of this data, along with data from the calibration set of presi-
dential elections, is provided as the file pres elections (see Sect. 2.1). The fol-
lowing day, the MOI published a new version of the data with minor changes.
The largest obvious modification was that the total number of votes in Bandar-
Abbas in the 14 June file was 390,141, exactly 100,000 votes greater than the
sum of the individual votes and invalid votes, and greater than the 2005 Bandar-
Abbas population of about 350,000, while in the 15 June file, this was corrected
to 290,141. Here, the original 14 June file is used. These two xls format files use
Western Arabic (European) numerals. A third file, in pdf format and using Arabic-
Indic (not Persian) numerals [Tables 8-1, 8-2 39], was also published on 15 June
2009 [25]. The URL that contained links to each of these three files is archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5hYWAcdhW.
2.3.2 Control data set: other recent, pre-2009 presidential-election first rounds
For comparison with the Iranian election, data from the first round of voting
in several comparable, recent elections were gathered. Some negative and positive
criteria for attempting to select statistically and sociologically comparable data
sets are the following.
(1) Parliamentary/congressional elections would differ from the 2009 Iranian
presidential election in that in the former case, voters often choose political
parties rather than focus on candidates, so the types of voting behaviour
patterns may not sufficiently match those in presidential elections.
(2) Presidential-election second rounds usually only have two candidates, so
would restrict the parameter freedom of the random variables more than in
a presidential election with many candidates. Single-round, non-preferential
elections also have less parameter freedom than runoff or preferential elec-
tions, since the former discourage voting for minor candidates.
(3) Countries with low populations risk having a narrower logarithmic range of
voting area sizes (and, hence, a narrower logarithmic range in votes for any
given candidate). Also, minority candidates in lowly-populated countries
are likely to have votes in some areas that tend towards the zero-vote limit
mentioned above.
(4) Practical (i.e. online) access to the data is preferable so that the data can
be independently, publicly archived and independent researchers can obtain
the (possibly updated) data directly from the official sources.
(5) There should be no major controversies regarding suspected artificial inter-
ference in the election results.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of online presidential-election first rounds from
relatively highly populated countries from different geographical areas that were
found for this study, in addition to those of the Iranian 2009 election. These in-
clude a well-established democracy in Western Europe, two countries that have
had regular elections for a few decades since emerging from left-wing and right-
wing authoritarian political systems, and the Iranian 2005 first-round presidential
election. The sociological diversity among these countries and the time span of
sustained electoral politics and elections among them should imply conservative
results, in the sense that an election which is statistically unusual in comparison
1Retrieval of the archival version may require manual removal of html header text and tab symbols,
e.g. using standard GNU/Linux tools, tail -n 1236 MOI.bin | head -n 1235 | sed -e ’s/^\\t\\t//’
> MOI.xls, where the retrieved file is named MOI.bin and the output file with head and tail removed is
to be named MOI.xls.
June 5, 2013 Journal of Applied Statistics moi2009-tmp
Journal of Applied Statistics 9
Table 1. Recent presidential-election first rounds, each with n candidates from m voting areas, and a total of
∑
xi votes.
country date m n(n0)
a
∑
xi
b admin. division source
France 2002-04-21 100 16 29, 183, 176 department [21]
Iran 2005-06-17 326 7 28, 155, 678 shahrestan [20]
Poland 2005-10-09 379 11(12) 14, 993, 138 powiat [26]
Brazil 2006-10-01 2832 5(7) 94, 785, 276 “electoral zone”c [35]
France 2007-04-22 100 12 36, 674, 996 department [22]
Iran 2009-06-12 366 4 39, 245, 991 shahrestan [23]
aThe analysis is carried out for n candidates, where those candidates among the original n0 who have 1%
or more votes of 1 or 0 are excluded (Section 2.2.2).
bTotal votes
∑
xi are the sums of total votes per i-th region, xi, stated in the source, except for the
Iranian 2005 election, where xi are summed from the candidates’ votes in the voting areas. The total votes∑
xi may differ from the full total due to groups not included in the main geographical regions, e.g. voters
living abroad, on ships, etc.
cThe “electoral zones” in the Superior Electoral Court’s data are smaller than states and larger than
municipalities.
to this calibration set of elections is unusual in comparison to a diverse set of
sociological situations rather than in comparison to a narrow set of sociological
situations. The administrative division levels (called “voting areas” in this paper)
were chosen with the aim of obtaining values of m that are logarithmically close
to the number of administrative divisions in the Iranian 2009 presidential-election
first round. The alternative to choosing the “electoral zone” level in the Brazilian
election would have been to choose the state/federal district level, giving m = 27.
The Iranian 2005 election first round should be that which most closely mimics
the statistical characteristics of that of Iran in 2009. Criterion (5) does not neces-
sarily imply that the elections were totally free of artificial interference. However,
if some artificial interference did occur in these control elections, then that should
most likely lead to an underestimate of the significance of an unusual statistical
signal in the Iranian 2009 presidential-election first round. Hence, this approach is
conservative.
2.4 Pre-election polls
At least twenty-seven pre-election opinion polls of Iranians’ voting intentions were
carried out from March to June 2009 and were publicly known and referenced by
the English-speaking community before the day of the election [11]. Among these,
six concerned Tehran only, two only gaving rankings rather than percentage sup-
port, one concerned impopularity rather than popularity, and one only concerned
employees, leaving 17 nationwide polls from 11 journalistic sources.
The sources of these polls are diverse. Several polls are reported by news organisa-
tions or from sources that are generally considered to be close to one or more of the
candidates. Thus, systematic biases could be suspected to be present either favour-
ing the incumbent candidate or favouring candidates representing either reformist
or conservative opposition sectors. The selection process implicit in the creation of
this list is a stochastic process that depends on the various positive and negative
feedback mechanisms in the editing of the English-language Wikipedia in general,
the way that these processes applied to the English-language Wikipedia article
concerning the Iranian 2009 presidential election in particular, and the way that
English-Persian bilingual editors participated in adding to the English-language
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article and correcting errors, possibly improving consistency between the versions
of the page in the two languages.
From the article’s creation on 2 May 2007 to the last edition on the day (UTC)
preceding the election, 11 June 2009, a total of 345 edits were made [12]. The
number of individual human authors (excluding robots and grouping together au-
thors identified by nearly identical Internet Protocol numbers) is about 85. From
the edit made on 10 April 2009 adding information on an opinion poll up to 11
June 2009, a total of 212 edits were made. Editing activity on the corresponding
Persian-language article started later and was more intense. From its creation on
25 August 2008 to the last edit on 11 June 2009 (UTC), a total of 969 edits were
made [3]. The number of individual human authors (excluding robots and grouping
together authors identified by nearly identical Internet Protocol numbers) is almost
identical to that of the English-language article, i.e. about 84. Information on pre-
election polls in the Persian-language article is not in the same tabular format as
in the English-language article. Consistency between different language versions of
a Wikipedia article is decided by consensus among bilingual editors. About seven
authors have edited both language versions.
These large numbers of editors and edits on the English and Persian versions of
the Wikipedia article, together with the highly open and well-documented nature of
the editing process, suggest that the English-language compilation of pre-election
opinion polls of the evening of 11 June 2009 is probably less biased than any other
compilation available prior to the date of the election. Table 2 lists these polls.1
2.4.1 Pre-election poll analysis
While the list of pre-election polls given in Table 2 is probably less biased than
any other English-language compilation available prior to the date of the election,
at least two reasons can be invoked to exclude some of the 17 polls listed in Table 2.
The two subsets of polls which could be excluded generally disfavour candidate A
and favour candidate M.
Firstly, the sources of seven polls (favouring candidate M since May 2009 and
candidate R five days before the election) are stated as being a combination of a
field survey and an internet survey, with a warning regarding a likely demographic
bias in favour of voters connected to the internet [36, 37]. Moreover, robots can
credibly introduce significant systematic errors in an internet survey, but (even
as of 2012), are extremely unlikely to introduce any errors in the raw datasets of
telephone or door-to-door surveys. Unless additional information estimating the
systematic errors in these surveys is added to the analysis, the exclusion of these
polls needs to be considered.
Secondly, two sources (favouring candidate M) are no longer online [5, 13]. No
online archival copy is known, so their data remain public only indirectly [11].
Hence, exclusion of these two polls should be considered. Alternatively, censorship
probabilities could included in the analysis. Websites more likely to favour candi-
dates disfavoured by the government could be considered to have a higher chance
of being closed down by administrative, political or financial methods. In order
to derive results that are conservative in the sense of favouring pro-government
candidates, these probabilities are neglected in this paper.
Elementary statistical tests are applied to different subsets of the pre-election
poll data shown in Table 2, excluding either the partially internet-based polls, the
polls that do not have a known online archive, or both, to see if the various subsets
1Another pre-election poll, carried out by non-Iranian organisations by telephone in early May 2009,
became known to the English-language online community after the election [38]. Inclusion of this additional
poll would not modify the results significantly.
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Table 2. Intentions of qi voters to vote for candidate j with probability wij in the 2009 Iranian presidential
first-round election, in the i-th of 17 pre-election opinion polls [11].
datea qi wiA wiR wiK wiM source organ.
b
< 10 June 2009 - 60%c - - 30%c [4] -
< 9 June 2009 7900 23 % - - 55.5%d [32] -
< 9 June 2009 1743 25.5 % 30.8 % 6.1 % 37.6 % [37]e R&B
< 7 June 2009 16,500f 61.1%c - - 27.2%c [4] IRIB
< 6 June 2009 16,945 22.5 % 4 % 7.5 % 64 % [5]g -
< 3 June 2009 - 29.5 % 25.2 % 7.5 % 37.5 % [37]e R&B
< 1 June 2009 - 53 % - - 36 % [28] Raja
26 May–5 June 2009h 300,000 24.61 % 10.14 % 10.72 % 54.53 % [17] -
31 May 2009 - 32 % 27 % 6 % 36 % [36]e R&B
< 31 May 2009 77,058 33 % 27 % 3 % 36 % [36]e Baz.
< 27 May 2009 1650 35 % - - 54 % [13]g -
< 26 May 2009 - 34 % - - 38 % [30] Ayan.
5 May 2009 - 38.1 % 14.7 % 11.1 % 30.6 % [37]e R&B
3–4 May 2009 - 59 % - - 22 % [29] Raja
< 3 May 2009 - 54 % - - 22 % [29] gov.
4 April 2009 - 40.4 % 0.6 % 7.9 % 23.5 % [37]e R&B
5 March 2009 - 43.7 % 0 % 7.2 % 12.9 % [37]e R&B
aThe dates of polls with upper limits to the polling date are interpreted to be one day before the upper
limit implicit in the source.
bPolling organisation if known: Ayandeh News (Ayan.), Baznevis (Baz.), “government” (gov.), Islamic
Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Rahbord & Danesh (R&B), Rajanews (Raja).
cThe source values for Tehran and the countryside are combined in the proportions of the official results,
i.e. 4,179,188:35,066,803 [23].
dThe source states 54–57%; the mean 55.5% is adopted here.
ePoll includes internet component. The polls of 5 March, 4 April, and 5 May also estimate 36.2%, 27.6%,
and 5.3% support, respectively, for candidate Kh, who announced his withdrawal on 16 March.
fThe source states 16,000–17,000.
gSource no longer online and no archival copy is known.
hThe median date (31 May) of the ILNA poll is adopted for that poll.
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Figure 1. Logarithmic widths (standard deviations) of per-candidate vote distributions vij vs widths of
total vote distributions xi. From left to right: Poland 2005, France 2002, France 2007, Brazil 2006, Iran
2005 (⊙); Iran 2009 (×).
are self-consistent, and if they are consistent with the official results [23]. Moreover,
after applying both exclusions, it still remains credible that among the remaining
eight polls, either those polls favouring candidate A or those disfavouring A could
contain systematic errors favouring or disfavouring A, respectively. Thus, both of
these subsets are considered separately, for self-consistency and for consistency
with the official results.
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Figure 2. As for Fig. 1, logarithmic widths of per-candidate voting rates v˜ij vs widths of total vote
distributions xi.
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Figure 3. Logarithmic distribution of the total vote counts xi.
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Figure 4. Logarithmic distribution of the vote counts viA for candidate A.
Can the stated numbers of people interviewed be used to assume that the error
in a poll is dominated by the random error implied by the Poisson limit associated
with the number of people interviewed, i.e. assuming negligible additional error
from the required demographic profile corrections? This would seem unrealistic.
For example, the prior-to-7 June IRIB survey [4] and the 26 May–5 June ILNA
survey [17], taken during approximately the same period, should differ in their
results by less than about 3% (95% confidence) if only the Poisson limit errors
are considered. Yet their estimates for candidates A and M differ by 36.5% and
27.3%, respectively. Clearly, the errors in at least one of these two cases are about
an order of magnitude larger than the minimum random error attainable for the
stated sample sizes. Moreover, nine of the polls do not state their sample size at
all.
June 5, 2013 Journal of Applied Statistics moi2009-tmp
Journal of Applied Statistics 13
0
5
10
15
20
10 100 1000 10000 100000 1e+06 1e+07
N
viR
Figure 5. Logarithmic distribution of viR, the vote counts for R.
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Figure 6. Logarithmic distribution of viK, the vote counts for K.
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Figure 7. Logarithmic distribution of viM, the vote counts for M.
Hence, for a conservative analysis of the data, linear least-squares best fits of
voting intentions as a function of civil date t ∈ [1, 100) in days, where 1 = 5 March
2009 and 100 = 12 June 2009 are made for the different subsets, giving equal
weights to all polls in a given subset. The quality of the fit is estimated using χ2
of the residuals, where the variance Var(wij) = (3%)
2 is assumed. This correponds
to assuming that the error is no more than the random error for a survey of 1000
people obtainable from the Poisson limit. The cumulative probability distribution
of the χ2 distribution then gives an estimate of the degree to which the polls of a
given subset agree with each other.
Since the assumed variance should in principle be an overestimate, but in prac-
tice may be an underestimate, the standard errors from the fits are then used to
estimate the uncertainty in the expected results of the 12 June vote for the majority
candidates A and M. The errors are assumed here to be random and normally dis-
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Figure 8. Calibration of confidence levels using the control data set. The empirical confidence levels ce are
shown against local bootstrap confidence levels cb as a thick curve, and the smooth fit is given by Eqs (8)
and (9). If the bootstrap confidence intervals were unbiased and symmetric, then the relation ce = cb
would hold, as illustrated for comparison.
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Figure 9. Example of a local bootstrap realisation for candidate 1 in the French 2007 presidential-election
first round, showing official voting rates v˜ij (⊙) and simulated voting rates v˜i
k′
j (×).
tributed. This is clearly only a rough approximation. Linear fits to the complement
of the major candidates’ pre-election support are also considered.
3. Results
Figure 1 shows that the two Iranian presidential elections have a higher dispersion
in the total population sizes of voting areas (shahrestans) than the elections used
for comparison. Unsurprisingly, the dispersions in the logarithmic vote counts for
the individual candidates are also higher in the Iranian elections compared to the
other four. Thus, the Iranian elections are more likely to approach the Benford’s
Law limiting case for first digit distributions than the other elections, since their
logarithmic distributions are wider. Moreover, the widths are roughly 0.5, so that,
to the degree that each distribution of vij is log-normal, about 68% of the corre-
sponding cumulative distribution should cover one decade. This is another factor
in favour of the Iranian elections approaching the Benford’s Law limit.
Figure 2 shows that this is not just an effect of the dispersion in the population
sizes of the voting areas. The voting rates v˜ij in the Iranian elections generally
are more widely log-dispersed than in the other four elections. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of the total votes per voting area, and Figs 4–7 show the distributions
of the votes for the four candidates.
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Figure 10. Frequency distribution f(d1) of the first digit d1 for candidate A (⊙) in the Ira-
nian 2009 presidential-election first round [23]. Lower and upper confidence levels of ce =
0.05%, 0.5%, 2.5%, 97.5%, 99.5%, 99.95%, using the local bootstrap simulations and the empirical calibra-
tion given in Eqs (8) and (9), are shown. The lower three confidence levels are close to one another and
difficult to distinguish in the plot. The limiting case of the Benford’s Law first-digit distribution is shown
as a thin line.
3.1 Empirical, local bootstrap model
Figure 9 shows an example local bootstrap, as described in Definition 2.1, for an
arbitrarily selected candidate (the first in the table) in an arbitrarily selected elec-
tion (the French 2007 election first-round). This illustrates how closely the local
bootstrap imitates the data set. The logarithmic dispersion of voting rates v˜ij for
this candidate is greatest in highly populated voting areas, i.e. for xi ∼ 10
6. The
bootstrap imitates this wide dispersion at xi ∼ 10
6 with little obvious effect on low
population voting areas. At lower populations, there are some outliers with low vot-
ing rates in the real data. The bootstrap realisation appears to reproduce similar
outliers, while also matching the bulk of the v˜ij distributions in these lower popula-
tion voting areas. Overall, the realisation appears to closely match the distribution
of the official data, possibly exaggerating the numbers of outliers. Subjectively, the
figure suggests, as expected, that the simulations should be conservative. They are
likely to statistically mimic features of the data even if those features constitute ar-
tificial interference in the data set. Only a very unusual interference in the data set
is likely to be considered extreme when compared to an ensemble of local bootstrap
simulations.
Another characteristic that is clear in the figure is that which is intrinsic to
bootstrap methods: a particular value of v˜ij may occur several times among the
values v˜ik′j , introducing a discreteness effect. However, in the present method, what
is of interest for first digit frequencies is v˜ik′ jxi. This should remove most of this
discreteness effect.
In order to estimate bootstrap confidence levels cbj(d) for rejecting each of the
candidates’ first digit frequencies in each of the elections in the control data set, 105
local bootstrap simulations were generated. Together with ce defined by the actual
frequency distribution of these values, least-squares fits were found numerically as
described above, giving
β− = 1.824, β+ = 1.487, c∗b = 0.566 (9)
in Eq. (8).
Figure 8 shows that the local bootstrap confidence intervals are biased and
skewed. They are conservative at high confidence levels at both the lower and
upper limits. Taken literally, the local bootstrap confidence intervals fail to reject
the actual first-digit frequencies as often as they should. For example, none of the
459 first-digit frequencies for candidates in the control elections fall below the lower
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Figure 11. First-digit frequency distribution f(d1) for candidate R, as for Fig. 10.
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Figure 12. First-digit frequency distribution f(d1) for candidate K, as for Fig. 10.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f
d1
Figure 13. First-digit frequency distribution f(d1) for candidate M, as for Fig. 10.
cutoff of the 95% confidence interval, i.e. the 2.5% percentile, as calculated directly
by the bootstrap method for each of those candidates, even though in principle
about 11 should. The calibration given by Eqs (9) and (8) and illustrated in Fig. 8
should provide more accurate (less conservative) estimates of confidence levels.
The inverse of Eq. (8) can also be useful, i.e.
cb(ce) =
{
(2ce)
1/β− c∗b , cb < c
∗
b
1−
{
[2 (1− ce)]
1/β+
}
(1− c∗b) , cb ≥ c
∗
b,
(10)
using β−, β+ and c∗b from Eq. (9).
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Figure 14. Pre-election poll voting intentions wij% (Table 2) for candidates j = A (⊙), R (squares),
K (triangles), M (×), versus date ti in days, where 100 = 12 June 2009 (the election date). Error bars
defined as 100%/
√
qi are shown as corresponding small/thin symbols, where qi := 1000 if no value is
stated in the table. Linear least-squares equal-weighted fits to wij(ti) for each j-th candidate are shown,
including extrapolations to 12 June. The 50% threshold for winning the election is shown. Upper panel:
all four candidates, all polls; lower panel: candidates A, M and RKO (total support for candidates R,
K and “other” inferred from support for A and M) (+), excluding partially internet-based and publicly
unarchived polls.
3.2 Iranian 2009 presidential election
Figures 10–13 show the first digit frequencies of the four candidates of the Iranian
2009 first-round presidential election using the corrected confidence intervals ce
corresponding to two-sided confidence levels of 95%, 99% and 99.9%.
It is clear in Fig. 12 that candidate K has an excess frequency of votes vij
that start with the digit 7, to a calibrated significance well above 99.9% (two-
sided). The bootstrap estimate is cbK7 > 99.924%, and the calibrated estimate is
ceK7 > 99.9960%, i.e. 1− ceK7 ≈ 4× 10
−5. Since this could be considered one of 36
independent tests for the full Iranian 2009 data set, a Sˇida`k-Bonferonni correction
factor [1] of 36 gives
p7 < 1.5× 10
−3 (11)
for rejecting the full data set. Even if the bias/skewness correction were ignored,
i.e. if cb were used, the full data set would still be rejected at a level of p < 3%
based on the excess of first-digit 7 votes for K, i.e. 36(1 − cbK7) ≈ 0.027.
3.3 Pre-election opinion polls
3.3.1 Candidates A and M
Figure 14 shows the pre-election poll data (Section 2.4, Table 2). Both panels
include equal-weighted, linear, least-squares fits to the temporal evolution of the
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Table 3. Internal consistency (confidence level p < p
χ2
) among subsets of the pre-election polls and external
consistency (confidence level p < pyj ) of official result yj/
∑
j yj with linear least-squares equal-weighted best
fit to poll evolution wij(ti).
selection pχ2(internal) pyj (external)
i.a u.b A+c A−d Npe A R K M RKOf A R K M RKOf
Y Y Y Y 17 0 10−11 0.736 0 − 10−16 10−11 10−12 10−5 −
N Y Y Y 10 0 − − 0 0.064 10−4 − − 0.003 10−4
Y N Y Y 15 0 10−4 0.638 10−15 − 10−11 0 10−8 10−3 −
N N Y Y 8 0 − − 0 0.064 0.004 − − 0.043 10−4
N N Y N 5 0.273 − − 0.153 0.948 0.131 − − 0.604 10−4
N N N Y 3 0.447 − − 0.050 0.706 0 − − 0.001 10−3
aAre the partially internet-based polls included (Yes/No)?
bAre the publicly unarchived polls included?
cAre polls where wiA ≥ 50% included?
dAre polls where wiA < 50% included?
eNumber of polls in subset.
fThe sum of votes for R, K, and other (O) are inferred from the votes for A and M in the cases where the
partially internet-based polls are excluded. The official result in this case is the sum of votes for R and K.
Table 4. Expected values E(w∗ij) and standard errors SE(w
∗
ij) of 12 June vote proportions w
∗
ij := wij(t =
12 June) for candidates j =A and M implied by linear least-squares equal-weighted best fits to wij(ti).
i.a u.b A+c A−d E(w∗iA) SE(w
∗
iA) E(w
∗
iK) SE(w
∗
iK) E(w
∗
iM) SE(w
∗
iM) E(w
∗
iRKO)
ef SE(w∗iRKO)
f
Y Y Y Y 36.4% 3.2% 7.1% 0.9% 44.5% 2.5% − −
N Y Y Y 36.3% 6.5% − − 50.1% 5.5% 13.6% 2.4%
Y N Y Y 38.4% 3.5% 7.0% 1.1% 40.8% 2.1% − −
N N Y Y 41.1% 7.4% − − 44.2% 5.2% 14.7% 2.8%
N N Y N 58.9% 2.3% − − 32.3% 2.7% 8.7% 1.2%
N N N Y 18.7% 4.6% − − 62.8% 8.9% 18.5% 4.3%
abcdfAs per Table 3.
eOfficial result [23]: yRK = 2.5%.
candidates’ support, which are extrapolated to the election date. Interpreted lit-
erally, the extrapolations of the linear fits to the election data would imply that
candidates A and M each won about 40% of the votes, i.e. a second-round of the
election was necessary. However, it is also clear that this is a best-fit that differs
from the individual poll results for A and M by ∼10–20% during the fortnight
preceding the election. This is the case for both panels, i.e. whether including or
excluding the partially internet-based and publicly unarchived polls.
For candidates A and M, the quality of the linear fits in these two panels, assum-
ing ±3% random, normally distributed errors (68% confidence) as stated above
(Section 2.4.1), is given for the full set of polls by χ2 ≈ 305 and 194, respectively,
for d = 16 degrees of freedom, and for the smaller set of polls by χ2 ≈ 188 and
92, respectively, for d = 7. This is why the confidence levels, shown in the first
and fourth rows of Table 3, respectively, show the χ2 confidence levels estimated
as pχ2 ≈ 0.
Table 4 shows the estimates of what the results of the first-round election on
12 June should have been if the linear fits and the residuals to the fits are used.
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Even in the fourth row, where the exclusions have been applied and five out of
the eight remaining polls are from sources that could be suspected of being more
likely to favour candidate A than candidate M [4, 28, 29], the best estimate is
that no candidate was expected to obtain over 50% support on 12 June. The
precision is about 200–400 times worse than that of the official results, where a
Poisson error would be about 0.02–0.03% for candidates A and M, rather than
about 5–7% as estimated here. This is partly because of the disagreement between
the different polls. Unless an assumption about which subset of polls is the most
reliable is made, it is difficult to make preciser estimates. Hence, assuming normal
error distributions, the probability of a first-round win by candidate A or M is
about p < 23% or p < 26%, respectively, from the fourth row of Table 4. This is
not a significant rejection of a win by either candidate. A larger subset of the polls
(higher row in the table) can increase or decrease the probability of a first-round
win by M, but in all three cases gives a significant rejection of a first-round win by
A. If the official results have been interfered with, then the estimate in the fourth
row of Table 4 may be more accurate than the official results, despite being a few
orders of magnitude less precise.
The final two rows of Table 4 show that if either the five polls favouring or the
three polls disfavouring candidate A (after the exclusions have been applied) are
considered alone, then either candidate A or M is expected to have very significantly
or insignificantly won the first-round election, respectively, assuming normal error
distributions. The corresponding values of pχ2 in the last two rows of Table 3 show
that the self-consistency among the polls in either subset considered alone is quite
high. The worst case is pχ2(M) = 0.050 for polls disfavouring A. Inspection of the
lower panel of Fig. 14 suggests that this is because wiM(ti) has a negative second
derivative in this case, i.e. M’s support appears to have saturated at a little over
50% about a week before the first-round election, if this subset of polls is considered
alone and without the addition of systematic error. These results are unsurprising:
polls favouring A are self-consistent and favour A, and polls disfavouring A are
marginally self-consistent for a linear fit and favour M.
3.3.2 Candidate K
While conclusions regarding whether candidate A or M or neither won the elec-
tion first-round are weak due to the disagreement between the pre-election polls,
the upper panel in Fig. 14 and the first and third rows of Table 3 show that despite
this disagreement, all the polls that published estimates of K’s support agree with
each other for the best linear fit for a ±3% assumed error. Moreover, the standard
error in the fit on the day of the election first-round is small. The first and third
rows of Table 4 show that for the two subsets that contain sufficient information
on K’s vote support in order to make a linear fit to the data, the expected result
for K is w∗iK ≈ 7± 1%, with a negligible dependence on inclusion/exclusion of the
two publicly unarchived polls.
This very strongly disagrees with the official result in the MOI data [23]. Can-
didate K only got 0.838% support in the official result. This is about six standard
errors lower than the mean. This is why pyK ≪ 1 in Table 3. The slope of the fit
is (−1 ± 3) × 10−4, i.e. (−1 ± 3)% over 100 days, for both poll subsets. That is,
K’s support is consistent with being constant over three months. Assuming that
K’s support did not change at all gives only slightly differing results to the above:
w∗iK ≈ 7.4± 1% and pyK ∼ 10
−15, 10−12 for the two poll subsets.
In other words, what the pre-election polls best agree on is that K’s support was
very close to constant for approximately three months. They agree on this with a
margin of error that is reasonable for carefully carried out opinion polls of typical
sample size (∼ 1000) and consistent with the scatter among the polls’ estimates
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for K’s support. These same polls reject the official result to very high significance.
Nevertheless, most of the polls that reported on support for candidate K are
partially internet-based. Hence, several interpretations of this result are possible,
including:
(1) there was a swing against K during the last several days preceding the
election, i.e. he lost about 90% of his support during the days preceding
the election; or
(2) the partially internet-based polls overestimated K’s support by about a
factor of 10; or
(3) the official result for K was artificially modified.
Case (1) seems unlikely. After three months of stable support, it seems sociologi-
cally unrealistic that 90% of K’s support would disappear in several days, barring a
dramatic, well-mediatised event that motivated an overwhelming majority of pre-
viously “committed” supporters of K to suddenly drop their support. The highly
significant excess of vote counts with first-digit “7” for candidate K found using the
local bootstrap method (Section 3.2) is consistent with case (3). However, without
a lot more information on the calibration methods and demographic profiling used
in these polls, it would be difficult to exclude case (2).
3.3.3 Candidates R, K, and “other” (O)
Could it be possible to estimate the expected 12 June result for K without relying
on the partially internet-based polls, despite the fact that most other polls did not
state the suport for K? Contingent on some credible assumptions, yes, though
indirectly. The complement of the polls’ estimates of support for candidates A and
M can be used. In principle, this should represent the sum of support for candidates
R and K and interviewees that were undecided or gave “other” responses to the
interview question. This combined voter component is designated as “RKO” in
Fig. 14 and Tables 3 and 4.
In fact, Table 2 shows that in those polls including information for all four
candidates, the sum of the four candidates’ support, or that of the five candidates
in the polls of 5 March, 4 April, and 5 May [where support for candidate Kh, who
announced his withdrawal on 16 March, is estimated at 36.2%, 27.6%, and 5.3%,
respectively [37]], are 100% ± 1%, except for the prior-to-6 June poll, where the
sum is 98% [5]. Since the fractions of undecided/other voters are rarely this small,
especially weeks or months prior to an election, this suggests that the tradition
in the reporting of opinion polls in Iran is to normalise away undecided/other
responses. If this speculation is correct, in the sense that all the polls listed follow
this tradition, then
wiRKO := 1− wiA −wiM (12)
should be a good approximation to wiRK, i.e. the sum of the support for the two
minor candidates, without the complication of undecided/other voters. However,
since this is only a speculation, the designation RKO will be retained initially.
The lower panel of Figure 14 and the RKO columns in Table 3 show that just as
the larger subset of polls best agree internally on candidate K’s vote support and
strongly disagree with the official result for K, the situation for RKO is similar. As
the second, fourth and lower rows of Table 3 show, pχ2 is higher for RKO than for
A and M in any given poll subset, i.e. the vote support estimates for RKO are more
self-consistent among the polls for RKO rather than for A or M. The linear best fits
for RKO also strongly reject the official result for RK if the “other” component is
neglected. These statements hold no matter which subset in Table 3 is chosen, even
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Table 5. Expected values E(w∗ij) and standard errors SE(w
∗
ij) of 12 June vote proportions, as for Table 4, but
for 10,000 numerical realisations, using the more accurate method (leading to smaller standard errors) detailed
in Sect. 3.3.4.
i.a u.b A+c A−d E(w∗iA) SE(w
∗
iA) E(w
∗
iK) SE(w
∗
iK) E(w
∗
iM) SE(w
∗
iM) E(w
∗
iRKO)
ef SE(w∗iRKO)
f
Y Y Y Y 36.4% 0.6% 7.1% 0.4% 44.5% 0.6% − −
N Y Y Y 36.3% 1.0% − − 50.1% 1.0% 13.6% 0.9%
Y N Y Y 38.4% 0.7% 7.0% 0.4% 40.8% 0.7% − −
N N Y Y 41.1% 1.2% − − 44.2% 1.1% 14.7% 1.0%
N N Y N 58.9% 1.7% − − 32.3% 1.2% 8.7% 1.1%
N N N Y 18.7% 2.0% − − 62.8% 2.9% 18.5% 2.7%
abcdefAs per Table 4.
Table 6. Expected values E(w∗ij) and standard errors SE(w
∗
ij) of 12 June vote proportions, as for Table 4, but
for 10,000 numerical realisations and a quadratic least-squares best fit, as detailed in Sect. 3.3.4.
i.a u.b A+c A−d E(w∗iA) SE(w
∗
iA) E(w
∗
iK) SE(w
∗
iK) E(w
∗
iM) SE(w
∗
iM) E(w
∗
iRKO)
ef SE(w∗iRKO)
f
Y Y Y Y 33.3% 0.9% 5.7% 0.6% 46.1% 0.9% − −
N Y Y Y 49.4% 1.8% − − 38.6% 1.8% 12.0% 1.6%
Y N Y Y 35.7% 1.0% 5.4% 0.6% 42.0% 0.9% − −
N N Y Y 54.0% 2.1% − − 36.0% 1.9% 10.0% 1.8%
N N Y N 63.7% 3.3% − − 25.0% 2.4% 11.3% 2.0%
N N N Y N/A
g
abcdefAs per Table 4.
gToo few polls in this case.
Table 7. Expected values E(w∗ij) and standard errors SE(w
∗
ij) of 12 June vote proportions, as for Table 4, but
for 10,000 numerical realisations and a cubic least-squares best fit, as detailed in Sect. 3.3.4.
i.a u.b A+c A−d E(w∗iA) SE(w
∗
iA) E(w
∗
iK) SE(w
∗
iK) E(w
∗
iM) SE(w
∗
iM) E(w
∗
iRKO)
ef SE(w∗iRKO)
f
Y Y Y Y 35.5% 1.4% 4.8% 1.0% 43.8% 1.3% − −
N Y Y Y 57.8% 3.7% − − 28.5% 3.2% 13.7% 2.9%
Y N Y Y 37.7% 1.5% 4.2% 1.1% 41.2% 1.3% − −
N N Y Y 54.5% 3.7% − − 31.5% 3.1% 14.0% 2.9%
N N Y N 68.2% 4.8% − − 24.5% 3.3% 7.3% 3.2%
N N N Y N/A
g
abcdefAs per Table 4.
gToo few polls in this case.
if the subset of five polls favouring A is analysed alone. The rightmost two columns
in Table 4 show the expected result w∗iRKO for the different poll subsets. It is clear
why the official result yRK = 2.5% is rejected to high significance. However, these
rejections depend on the role of the “other” component. Possible interpretations
include:
(1) some or most of the polls in any subset are not normalised polls, so that
wiRKO includes a component of ∼ 5–15% of undecided voters, and most of
this category of voters made a decision during the last several days to vote
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for A or M, or did not vote; or
(2) most or all of the polls are normalised polls, and there was a swing against
R and/or K during the last day or two preceding the election, i.e. they
together lost about 70–90% of their support during the last several days
preceding the election; or
(3) the official result for R and/or K was artificially modified.
Hence, similar results are obtained whether the partially internet-based polls are
included and K’s pre-election support and official result are analysed, or if the
partially internet-based polls are excluded, the remaining polls are assumed to be
normalised, and the combined vote RKO (equal to RK by assumption) is analysed
instead. The possibility of “other” voters in pre-election polls becoming invalid
voters in the official poll has little effect on the above three possibilities, since the
percentage of invalid votes was officially only about 1%.
3.3.4 Sensitivity to linear assumption
Given the inconsistency of the pre-election poll data, it would be difficult to
justify fitting a more complex model of the evolution of voters’ intentions. Nev-
ertheless, it would be interesting to see how sensitive the conclusions are to the
assumption of a linear relation. Given that fractional voting intentions wij are
bound between zero and unity, and that their sum is unity by definition, it is not
trivial to choose the most realistic non-linear function for fitting the data. Linear
fits themselves are not bound by the unit interval, as can be seen by the extrapo-
lated negative support for candidate R in Fig. 14 (upper) in early March 2009.
In order to qualitatively examine at least some alternatives to a linear fit,
quadratic and cubic least-squares equal-weighted best fits have been carried out,
using 10,000 numerical realisations in each case in order to simplify calculation of
standard errors. In comparison to the method in Sect. 2.4.1, this procedure makes
it easier to make the more accurate, but still conservative, assumption that each
survey concerned 1000 valid interviewees, and calculate Poisson errors per can-
didate, rather than assume a 3% error in all cases. This is still conservative in
the sense that all surveys with published numbers claim higher sample sizes. Each
realisation generates a simulated set of poll results by starting with each known
poll result, calculating the Poisson error for the number of interviewees favouring
a given candidate, and offsetting the known result by a number drawn from a nor-
mal distribution with this standard deviation. A quadratic or cubic least-squares
fit is made to each realisation. An ensemble of realisations (with either quadratic
or cubic fits) is used to estimate standard errors. Since this method differs from
that used above, and should yield smaller standard errors, a linear fit was also
performed with this method, in order to enable direct comparison.
Tables 5–7 show the equivalent expected values and standard errors for the first-
round election result when linear, quadratic, and cubic least-squares fits are found
numerically this way. The results are not generally sensitive to the degree of the
polynomial chosen for fitting. The strongest result from the pre-election poll data,
that the expected RKO support is much greater than the official result of yRK =
2.5%, appears to be robust. A few cases are sensitive to the linearity assumption,
especially for candidates A and M when subsets of polls are analysed. For example,
the fourth row of Tables 6 and 7 shows that a first-round win by candidate A
is likely in both the quadratic and cubic cases, provided that both the partially
internet-based polls and the publicly unarchived polls are excluded. However, to
get close to the official result of yA = 62.5%, the polls disfavouring candidate A
also have to be excluded (fifth row).
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Figure 15. Distribution of the folded logarithmic vote counts for candidate K (cf. Fig. 10, bottom-left).
4. Discussion
The excess of first-digit 7 votes for candidate K seen in Fig. 12 implies a rejection
of the null hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that no artificial interference occurred
in the first-round Iranian 2009 presidential election results, at a confidence level
for the full data set of p7 < 1.5 × 10
−3 [Eq. (11)]. This estimate is obtained by
a highly conservative method based on the data themselves—a local bootstrap
method—and calibrated using similar, prior elections. In other words, it is very
difficult to explain this excess of “K7” votes by assuming that among voting areas
of approximately the same voting population size, the actual votes for a candidate
can be modelled as being randomly drawn from the statistical pattern (distribution)
of voting rates for voting areas of about that size for that candidate. Patterns as
unusual as the excess of 7-something votes for K did not occur in the five previous
presidential elections studied in the present work.
Are there caveats that could weaken this result? What alternative possible ex-
planations, including artificial interference, may there be for this excess?
4.1 Small numbers of data values
The actual number of voting areas whose vote counts for K start with the digit 7
(“K7”’s) is 41. The Benford’s Law limiting expectation for this digit, for 366 voting
areas, is 21.2, and the upper confidence limits shown in Fig. 12 lie in between these
two values. Intuitively, it may seem difficult to believe that just a few dozen or so
voting areas with 7-something votes are unusual enough to reject the credibility
of the whole data set. The intuitive error here is probably related to not thinking
through the process that (assuming no interference in the data) generated the data.
Large numbers of Iranians thought individually, communicated with each other in
networks and groups, and eventually made some marks on paper indicating their
voting decisions. If Iranian voters in voting areas of about the same size, voting
for a given candidate, can be validly modelled by a statistical distribution of a
shape determined by the official election results, then there is not much numerical
freedom for the vote numbers to vary other than according to that distribution.
On the contrary, the smallness of the number of unusual votes could be con-
sidered a factor in favour of an alternative hypothesis of artificial interference, if
artificial interference is to be made in a way that is perceived to be unlikely to
be detected. Someone wishing to interfere in the data might underestimate the
natural constraints for self-consistency within the data set. That is, s/he might
intuitively, but incorrectly, guess that modifying a dozen or so values in a table of
over a thousand values is statistically insignificant, and, thus, undetectable.
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Figure 16. Proportion of vote counts viA/xi against total votes vj , for candidate A. Voting areas are
selected by whether K’s vote count has the first digit 7 (×) or another digit (⊙). The vertical (logarithmic)
scales differ greatly between this figure and Figs 17–19, in order to show the structures of the distributions.
To compare the widths of the log10 vij/xi distributions in the four figures, see Fig. 2.
4.2 Copying error
Could the excess of K7’s just be a copying error by employees under pressure in
a stressful situation? Various sources of unintentional (but artificial) errors are
possible. The present analysis only concerns the data as published by the MOI,
not a version of the data closer to the “raw” values provided by individual voting
centres. However, this number remained stable from the first to third versions of
the data. The number of entries that start with 7 under candidate K in the Arabic-
Indic numerals pdf file is 41 [25], in agreement with that of the first xls file [23].
4.3 Could K’s vote distribution be especially spiky/noisy?
Logarithmic intervals of first digits give unequal weights to the different digits if
an intrinsic distribution is logarithmically uniform. Could K’s vote distribution be
in general spiky (noisy), for a reason unrelated to human perception of the decimal
system, with some spikes hidden in the low digits (1, 2) because they correspond
to wider intervals? Figure 15 suggests that this is not the case. The excess of vote
counts starting with 7 is the only obvious spike in K’s vote distribution for bins of
a size and offset that match the first-digit 7 bin.
Moreover, another property of K’s vote distribution suggests that this should be
more smooth than typical vote distributions. The frequency distribution of votes
vij is a convolution of the distributions of vij/xi together with the distribution of
effective population sizes xi of the voting areas. The narrower the distributions
vij/xi are, the less the convolution will smooth out the underlying distribution of
xi, and in turn, the less the first-digit frequency will be smooth.
In Fig. 2, the second highest value of σ[log10(vij/xi)] of any of the presidential
elections is that of candidate K. The four widths σ[log10(vij/xi)] of the votes for A,
R, K, and M are 0.12, 0.34, 0.42, and 0.24, respectively. Candidate K is the candi-
date in the first-round 2009 Iranian election who should least be expected to have a
noisy first-digit frequency distribution. The 68% width (assuming normality) of the
logarithmic viK/xi distribution is approximately an order of magnitude. So unless
the shape of the viK/xi distribution is exceptionally spiky and correlated between
different voting population sizes xi, the resulting first-digit frequency should be
very well smoothed out. The narrowest width is for candidate A. Figures 10–13 do
suggest that apart from the excess of first-digit 7 votes (and slight lack of first-digit
6’s and 8’s) for K, A’s first-digit frequency distribution is the most spiky of the
four candidates’ distributions, even when the local bootstrap method is used to
estimate confidence levels.
June 5, 2013 Journal of Applied Statistics moi2009-tmp
Journal of Applied Statistics 25
0.0003
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
1000 10000 100000 1e+06 1e+07
v i
R
/x
i
xi
Figure 17. R’s proportions of vote counts, as for Fig. 16.
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Figure 18. K’s proportions of vote counts, as for Fig. 16. The selection by the first digit 7 is clear.
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Figure 19. M’s proportions of vote counts, as for Fig. 16.
Hence, spikiness in K’s vote distribution seems to occur uniquely in the first-
digit 7 bin, and it does so in a way that manages to avoid a smoothing effect
that is stronger than for the other candidates in the same election and nearly all
candidates in the five control elections.
4.4 Does an interference hypothesis lead to any further unusual properties?
4.4.1 The six most populous voting areas and the excess 7d2d3d4 vote counts for
K
If the excess 7’s for K indicate interference in the data, then other signs of
interference could be expected. A reasonable hypothesis would be that vote counts
for one of the major candidates were decreased or increased. Figures 16, 17, 18 and
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Table 8. Votes for K and proportion of votes for A for the six voting areas with the greatest numbers of total
votes.
voting area xi viK viA/xi
Tabriz 876919 3513 0.497
Shiraz 947168 7078 0.600
Karaj 950243 8057 0.537
Isfahan 1095399 7002 0.609
Mashhad 1536106 7098 0.669
Tehran 4179188 43073 0.433
19 show proportions of votes that each candidate received as a function of total
votes, where those voting areas selected by having 7 as the first digit in K’s vote
count are highlighted.
It is clear in Fig. 16 that for candidate A, among the six voting areas with the
greatest numbers of total votes, the three of these that voted for A in the highest
proportions are all selected by the K first digit 7. Data for these six voting areas
are listed in Table 8. Fig. 19 shows correspondingly that the three of the six most
populous voting areas who voted least for M are also those selected by the K first
digit 7. Since the vote fractions for K and R are (in the MOI data) only about 1%
each, the high proportions of votes for A necessarily imply low proportions of votes
for M.
Are these two subsets of the set of the six most populous voting areas, the
d1(K) = 7 group voting over 60% for A, versus the d1(K) 6= 7 group voting less
than 55% for A, significantly distinct? The number of points is very small, but
the separation between the two populations seems to be clear. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test is a non-parametric test that enables the comparison of these
two populations. Among the six voting areas with the highest vote numbers, the
probability that the three vote proportions for A {viA/xi | d1(K) = 7} and the three
vote proportions for A {viA/xi | d1(K) 6= 7} are sampled from the same probability
density function, or equivalently, that the vote proportions {viA/xi | viA/xi > 0.60}
and the vote proportions {viA/xi | viA/xi < 0.55} are sampled from the same
probability density function, is
pKS6biggest ≈ 0.100. (13)
This high probability may seem counterintuitive, since the two sets of three values
are completely non-overlapping. However, the number of values is extremely small.
Non-parametric tests in general have less statistical power than parametric tests,
so it is unsurprising that the test is weak.
A stronger test can be applied if it is assumed that the two sub-samples can be
approximated as being sampled from normal or log-normal distributions. In this
case, the difference in the two means is about 3.7 or 3.5 standard errors in the
mean, respectively, i.e. the probability that the two subsamples distinguished by
the K excess 7’s among the six biggest shahrestans have the same mean is rejected
at
pG6biggest < 5× 10
−4. (14)
The introduction of an assumption regarding possible distribution shapes enables
a much more significant rejection of the two samples being drawn from a single
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Table 9. Frequencies N of the two-digit votes for K starting with the digit 7.
viK 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
N 1 2 1 4 1 4 1 2 1 3
distribution than the non-parametric approach. The dependence on the distribution
shape (normal vs log-normal) does not appear to be strong.
Could it be expected that, in the absence of artificial interference, there is any
statistical dependence between the initial first digit test leading to the excess of
7’s for K and the separation of the largest six voting areas into two distinct distri-
butions using this same characteristic? This seems unlikely.
Another coincidence is obvious among the three 7d2d3d4 vote counts shown in
Table 8: the second digit d2 is zero in all three cases. The standard form of Benford’s
Law should provide a reasonable approximation to the expected second digit dis-
tribution, especially given that K’s vote distribution is logarithmically wide, with
σ[log10(vij/xi)] = 0.42. Benford’s Law for the second digits gives the probability
of 0 as a second digit to be 11.97%, i.e. slightly greater than 10%. (The expected
frequency of second digit d is
∑9
k=1 log10[1 + 1/(10k + d)].) The probability that
all three digits are identical—but not necessarily 0—is
pd2=d3=d4 ≈ 0.01037, (15)
i.e. slightly greater than 10(0.1)3, which would be estimated assuming a uniform
linear distribution of values.
Again, this should be independent of the previous probability estimates. There is
no reason why dividing the six most populous voting areas into two groups based
on their first digit for K’s votes being 7, or being in the upper or lower half of
voting proportions for A, should have an effect on the second digits of K’s votes.
If we suppose that (i) these three voting areas (Shiraz, Isfahan and Mashhad for
7078, 7002 and 7098 votes for K respectively) should have proportions of about
50% for A in agreement with Tabriz and Karaj, which follow an approximately
linear upper boundary to A’s proportions of votes in the log-log plot in Fig. 16,
and if (ii) the total number of votes should remain constant, then from Table 8
this would imply that the correct number of votes for A would be about 473,000
less than in the MOI table. To keep the total number of votes constant, M’s, K’s
and R’s votes would also have to be corrected. If these are corrected in proportion
to the three candidates’ overall vote percentages, then the difference between A’s
and M’s total vote counts would be reduced by about one million votes.
4.4.2 Excess 7d2 vote counts for K
The viK = 7d2d3d4 voting areas comprise just a small fraction of the total number
of excess first digit 7 votes for K. In Fig. 6, a peak in the 70’s, i.e. 7d2 votes appears
to be strong. Table 9 shows these vote counts.
This distribution is quite literally odd. Most (15 out of 20) of the votes are
odd, and the few even votes that occur are themselves distributed with perfect
uniformity. Every even number occurs exactly once. The latter necessarily implies
the former—these two coincidences are dependent on one another. Given that 20
randomly chosen integers lie in the range from 70 to 79, what is the probability
for each even number to occur exactly once (and by implication, for there to be
a large majority of odd numbers)? Alternatively, a more conservative estimate of
how unusual this distribution is would be to calculate the probability for at least
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Table 10. Parity frequencies N of the K7-selected vote counts and the cumulative binomial tail probabilities p.
candidate j
selection A R K M
N(vij even | d1(viK) = 7) 18 15 18 16
N(vij odd | d1(viK) = 7) 23 26 23 25
p 0.266 0.059 0.266 0.106
Table 11. Numbers of polling stations Npoll and polling station observers per candidate Npoll
j
[10]a and an
advisor for M [18]b; “-” indicates no value claimed.
Npoll Npollj ref
selection A R K M
45692 33058 5421 13506 40676 a
− − − − 25000 b
15 out of the 20 integers in the range 70 to 79 to be all odd or all even. In both
cases, the distribution among the 10 numbers should be logarithmically uniform.
Numerical generation of 20-tuplets of numbers
{⌊10log10 70+xk log10(8/7)⌋}k=1,20, (16)
where xk is selected uniformly on [0, 1), gives a sample of a logarithmically uniform
distribution of numbers in the interval [70, 80). This gives the probability that
each even number occurs exactly once to be p ≈ 5× 10−4. The more conservative
probability, i.e. the probability that either at least 15 of the twenty 7d2 vote counts
for K are odd or at least 15 of the twenty 7d2 vote counts for K are even, given
that they are randomly selected from a logarithmically uniform distribution in the
range [70, 80), is (unsurprisingly) higher,
p7d2 ≈ 0.04, (17)
which is identical to the corresponding binomial probability to this precision. Taken
alone, this gives the odd dominance of 7d2 votes for K to be only marginally
significant.
However, Table 10 shows that the vote counts for the full set of 41 K7-selected
shahrestans are dominated by odd votes for all four candidates. If the parity of the
vote counts is an independent statistic, then the overall probability is
pK7odd ≈ 0.00044, (18)
so the overall dominance of odd vote counts in K7-selected voting areas is highly
significant.
4.5 Polling station observer crosschecks
Brill [10] states that all four candidates had thousands of observers at individual
polling stations (Table 11). He argues that since there were no disputes about
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discrepancies between observers’ records of individual polling station results and
the Ministry’s statement of the same numbers, there cannot be shahrestan-level
interference in the vote counts, since the latter must be the sums of the individual
polling station results, which were undisputed. Flaws that weaken this reasoning
include:
(1) The K7 anomaly firstly concerns candidate K. Registered observers for K
were absent from the vast majority of polling stations, even with only one
observer per polling station (Table 11).
(2) There was sufficient time for top-down artificial interference as hypothesised
by [33]: large-scale results were released first, and the detailed results needed
only minimal interference in order for the arithmetic to be consistent. Tens
of thousands of numbers can be summed in much less than a second on a
2009 personal computer.
(3) The number of M’s observers is disputed between M and governmental
authorities (Table 11).
(4) Given the prepoll analysis here (Sect. 3.3) and Mebane [19]’s analysis, a
credible hypothesis would be of major reductions in votes for R and K,
major (∼ 5–15%) additions of votes for A, and possibly minor reduction in
votes for M. R and K had very few observers, so the chance of their observers
discovering polling station discrepancies is low. Candidate A had many ob-
servers, but expecting them to complain about the Ministry overestimating
the vote counts for A compared to what they observed is unrealistic. People
responsible for vote-count alterations were likely to have been aware of the
relatively large number of M observers, and may have been aware of their
localisation, in order to know at which polling stations interference would
have been detectable. Even if the claim that M observers were present at
40,676 of the 45,692 polling stations is accepted, interference in the other
5,016 polling stations may have been sufficient to match the earlier province
and shahrestan level results.
Nevertheless, Brill [10]’s argument points to a method of reducing the chance
of interference in future Iranian presidential elections. Polling station crosschecks
by observers for all candidates at all polling stations, along with allowing mobile
and landline telephone networks [18] and the internet to remain active prior to, on
and following the election day, would enable the rapid, progressive release of the
complete per-polling-station and summed results by all candidates independently.
Discrepancies could then be traced and resolved individually.
4.6 Post-election opinion polls
Several opinion polls were carried out after the election first round and revealed
publicly more than six months later [15]. Given the intense social conflict that
occurred following the election, a linear model of public support for the four can-
didates across both the pre- and post-election periods is likely to be a considerably
less realistic model than that presented in the opinion poll analysis in this work,
which excludes the post-poll period. These post-election polls find that shortly after
and several months after the election first round, candidate A had about 55–65%
support.
Accepting the post-election polls as accurate requires accepting the sociological
assumption that Iranians’ opinions are accurately described by statistical mod-
elling. If Iranians’ voting preferences can be modelled as random variables that
depend mainly on demographic profiles and are measurable using standard meth-
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ods of random sampling, then it is hard to reject the much more conservative local
bootstrap model, which uses the official vote counts as their own model. In other
words, accepting the post-election polls as statistically meaningful requires accept-
ing the official first-round election results to be statistically anomalous. Statistical
techniques cannot be accepted in the case with a sample size of N ∼ 103 and re-
jected where N ∼ 107.5 and fewer assumptions are required. Thus, the statistical
evidence for artificial interference in the election results remains overwhelming, but
the true results remain uncertain. One possible interpretation of the post-election
polls is that they could be seen as strengthening the case that if no interference
in the vote counts had occurred, then candidate A would have won a first-round
absolute majority (row 5 of Tables 3 and 4, excluding partially internet-based polls,
publicly unarchived polls, and polls disfavouring A) and it would have been widely
accepted as legitimate. For opinion poll data to be more useful in the future, it
would be best if a variety of Iranian institutes, well-reputed for independence and
statistical methodology, carried out the polls and published detailed reports of
methodology and results.
5. Summary and conclusion
A local bootstrap method was defined (Definition 2.1) in order to conservatively
analyse vote-count first-digit frequencies in presidential-election first rounds with-
out assuming the Benford’s Law limit. Its validity is not necessarily restricted to
this domain, but the interest here is that the method can be applied to the 2009
Iranian presidential-election first round. The method was calibrated on a control
set of five presidential-election first rounds (2002–2006) and applied to the vote
counts per voting area published on 2009-06-14 by the Ministry of the Interior of
the Islamic Republic of Iran [23].
The most deviant first-digit frequency is the excess of first-digit 7 votes
(d1(viK) = 7) for candidate K. This is obvious in Fig. 12 and is also present for
uniformly spaced bins in the folded logarithmic vote-count distribution in Fig. 15.
The uncorrected bootstrap estimate of the significance of the excess implied by the
control elections is 1 − cbK7 < 8 × 10
−4. The correction ce(cb) for bias and skew-
ness derived from the control elections is given in Eqs (8) and (9). The corrected
significance is 1 − ceK7 ≈ 4 × 10
−5. A Sˇida`k-Bonferonni correction factor [1] of 36
gives the probability of finding a first-digit deviation this strong in the full dataset
of p7 < 1.5 × 10
−3 [Eq. (11)].
This excess is all the more difficult to explain by any natural voting process
given that the logarithmic width (standard deviation) of candidate K’s voting rate
distribution σ[log10(viK/xi)] = 0.42 is the second greatest of that of any candidate
among the Iranian 2009 and five earlier, similar datasets. This width indicates a
wide scatter in people’s voting rates for any given voting region size, which should
smooth out the resulting vote counts viK and push first-digit frequencies towards
the Benford’s Law limit.
If the K7 anomaly is a genuine coincidence, i.e. if a chance numerical coincidence
that happens about once in a thousand times to statistically equivalent datasets
occurred rather than artificial interference in the data, then selecting voting areas
by this criterion should constitute an arbitrary method of selecting a subset of the
full data, and should not lead to further unusual events. However, K7 selection
does lead to several coincidences, one of which appears to favour candidate A, who
officially won the election first round, in the six most populous voting areas.
(1) Of the six voting areas with the greatest total numbers of voters, listed in
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Table 8 (see also Fig. 16), three of these (Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad) satisfy
this criterion, i.e. they have vote totals for K that start with 7 (7078,
7002, 7098 votes respectively). All three of these have greater proportions
of votes for A than the other three voting areas. The probability for the
two sub-groups of the six big cities to be drawn from the same distribution
is mildly rejected by a non-parametric (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) test, with
pKS6biggest ≈ 0.100 [Eq. (13)], but strongly rejected by a parametric (difference
in means, assuming either normal or log-normal distributions) test, with
pG6biggest < 5× 10
−4 [Eq. (14)].
(2) The other surprising property of the three big cities that have total votes
starting with the digit 7 for K is that they all have the same second digit.
The probability for the second digit of all three to be equal (not necessarily
zero) is pd2=d3=d4 ≈ 0.01 [Eq. (15)].
(3) The voting areas that voted for K with a total of 7d2 votes, for any digit
d2, show an unusual characteristic: 15 of the 20 values are odd numbers,
and the even numbers occur exactly once each (Table 9). The chance of the
former is p7d2 ≈ 0.04 [Eq. (17)]. However, a related coincidence is that the
full set of K7-selected shahrestans is dominated by odd vote counts for all
four candidates, giving pK7odd ≈ 0.00044 [Eq. (18)].
This sequence of significantly unusual properties of the MOI dataset is difficult
to explain other than by artificial intervention in the data. While it is true that all
of these tests (except for the plan to use a Benford’s-Law-like analysis) are post-hoc
tests, i.e. they were chosen after seeing the data, a Sˇida`k-Bonferonni correction [1]
cannot help much. Combining the initial local-bootstrap first-digit test, (1) the
six biggest cities parametric test, and (3) the odd dominance of the K7-selected
shahrestan vote counts, and a Sˇida`k-Bonferonni correction of C gives
pall < Cp7 p
G
6biggest p
K7
odd = 3× 10
−10C. (19)
For pall to be rejected with less than 95% confidence, C would have to be greater
than 108. It is difficult to imagine that the number of similar statistical tests to
those used above is this large. A stronger objection to this estimate of pall is that
these different tests may not be statistically independent. However, it is difficult
to imagine any natural dependence between these three tests, which each give
p ∼ 10−3 or lower individually, that could bring the probability of their combined
occurrence to anywhere near unity.
While the first-digit analysis and subsequent unusual characteristics of the MOI
data are difficult to explain other than as an effect of artificial interference, these
(mostly) do not lead to any indications of what the unaltered data would look
like, apart from the six-big-cities K7 selection, in which K7-selected vote counts
for A can be interpreted as a misestimate of the true vote, suggesting that that the
difference between A’s and M’s vote totals is overestimated by about one million
votes.
The set of pre-election opinion polls presented and analysed above in Table 2,
Fig. 14, and Tables 3 and 4 gives qualitatively similar results. This list of polls
appears to be that which was constructed by what is likely to be the least biased
(not necessarily unbiased) method available to the English-speaking community.
The Wikipedia article in which the list was originally compiled included 345 edits
to the English-language Wikipedia article up to 11 June 2009 (inclusive) [12], 969
edits to the corresponding Persian-language Wikipedia article [3] up to the same
date, each by about 84 individual human authors, seven of whom edited both
articles, and the number of readers who found the information sufficiently accurate
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and reflecting a neutral point of view that they declined to edit the articles is
certainly much larger [11, 12]. Linear least-squares fits to the poll set show the
following.
(1) No matter which subset of polls is chosen, the linear least-squares fits to
the polls internally agree best on the vote intention evolution either for
candidate K alone or for the implied RKO (R plus K plus “other”) vote
intentions compared to either of the major candidates, A and M (or R alone
in the former case) (pχ2 , Table 3).
(2) The official results are rejected significantly or to very high significance for
nearly every candidate (or RKO) in nearly every subset of polls (pyj in
Table 3, and Table 4).
(3) Even the most conservatively selected subset of polls, that excludes partially
internet-based and publicly unarchived polls and selects those remaining
polls that give an absolute majority to candidate A (fifth row of the two
tables), rejects the official combined vote for candidates R and K with p ≈
10−4, provided that most or all of the polls are normalised (undecided/other
responses excluded), which appears to be the case from the available data.
(4) The poll subset favouring A (fifth row of the two tables) implies a highly
significant win for A, while the subset disfavouring A (sixth row of the two
tables) implies a weakly significant win for M.
(5) Unless the subset favouring or disfavouring A is chosen, the best estimate
of the election result is that both A and M received less than or just slightly
over 50% of the votes (∼ 35–40 ± 7% and ∼ 40–50 ± 5%, respectively).
Neither a first-round win by A, a first-round win by M, or a need for a
second round election are significantly excluded.
(6) Unless the subset favouring or disfavouring A is chosen, the most likely
correct result was that neither candidate won the election first round.
Several possible interpretations of (1)–(3) are listed in Section 3.3.3. If the par-
tially internet-based polls overestimated K’s support by about a factor of 10 and
if most of the polls that do not state support levels for K are not normalised, then
the polls would be consistent with the official results. However, those polls that
state support for all the candidates are normalised.
If there was a swing of about 90% against K or about 70–90% against R and/or
K during the last several days of the election, i.e. if nearly all of their supporters
suddenly changed their minds just before the election, then this also would be
consistent with the official results. However, the data that are available for K show
support consistent with being constant over three months, suggesting that a 70–
90% loss of support would require an extremely sudden, strong discouragement of
previously loyal supporters.
The most consistent way to explain these results would appear to be the hypoth-
esis of artificial interference in the official results. In this case, if the best estimates
for the correct results are obtained from the pre-election polls alone, then this
would give about 7% support to candidate K or about 10–20% support to candi-
dates R and K together in the 12 June first-round results (Table 4), in contrast
with the official result of 2.5% for the combined vote for R and K. This would be
consistent with the first-digit analysis and subsequent unusual properties of the
official results, which point directly to extremely unusual properties starting from
the excess of vote counts for K that start with the digit 7.
Further evidence for or against either the hypothesis of no interference in the
data or the opposite could potentially be obtained by examining the vote counts
in the six largest shahrestans (Table 8), and in odd-dominated K7-selected and
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shahrestans (Table 10). The voting areas’ names are listed in the table published
by the MOI [23–25].
Although the local bootstrap method presented here has led to the detection
of highly significant anomalies in an electoral poll, the reverse would not be true
in general. Benford’s-Law-like tests may detect anomalies in a dataset but cannot
guarantee the absence of anomalies, because many randomising effects can combine
to hide artefacts. The anomalies detected in the analysis presented above, where
the big city effect suggests an error of about one million votes, may not constitute
the full set of anomalies, nor do they provide an estimate of the unaltered data.
The compilation of pre-election poll data, despite relatively poor reporting quality
in individual sources available directly or indirectly in the English language, prob-
ably together provide the most robust estimates available of the unaltered data.
Higher quality poll reporting, in particular including data for all candidates and
undecided/other percentages, as well as detailed methodologies, would reduce the
ambiguities remaining in analyses of pre-election data.
Regarding the Iranian 2009 presidential-election first round in particular, at least
three statistical analyses independent of this work have been carried out [6, 9, 19].
Based on very different methods of analysis and to some degree on different data
(e.g. including the 2005 election results and excluding pre-election opinion polls),
the analyses of Mebane [19] and Chatham House [9] come to conclusions that are
compatible with the present results, in particular regarding the unusual nature of
the official results for candidate K.
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